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I Introduction 
 
It  is a commonplace now that the social-security systems, which in most 
countries are organised according to the pay-as-you-go method, are severely 
affected by the aging of the population. I would like to mention just one number 
which illustrates this, namely the  ratio of people over 64 to those of age between 
20 and 64. This ratio was 0.25 in Austria in the year 2000 and will increase to 
0.53 in the year 2050, according to the recent demographic forecast. Similar 
numbers are to be expected for most industrialised countries. As is well-known, 
the two factors responsible for this development are an increase in life-
expectancy (about six years for women and seven years for men until 2050) and 
a decrease in fertility.  
 
This fact has originated numerous discussions among academics as well as 
politicians as to the adequate way of how the social-security system should be 
reformed. Proposals range from a fundamental rebuilding of the whole system to 
far less spectacular changes of some parameter values. In order to assess these 
proposals, it helps to consider them within a unifying framework, which makes 
the specific characteristics of various changes visible. Accordingly, the intention 
of the present contribution is to analyse the properties of the social security 
system and of  suggested reforms from a common perspective, as it has 
emerged within the last decades. Following a public economics approach, the 
focus is on welfare effects stemming from changes  in real variables such as 
consumption; I do not deal with monetary and financial market effects. 
 
Of course, the contribution does not provide a comprehensive survey of all 
aspects relevant for pension reform, which are reflected in a huge amount of 
literature on that topic. Rather, the contribution will be confined to some basic 
issues, which are at the heart of any reform proposal.
1 It will also not deal with 
political-economic questions, such as the increasing political power of the older 
generations, which obviously are very important for public decision-making on 
social security systems. 
                                                 
1 For a broad and careful investigastion of the effects of pension reform see e. g., the recent study by 
Lindbeck and Persson 2002.   3
 
As a first step it is interesting to ask why pensions are a field of public activity at 
all.
2 One should keep in mind that usually we have the view that public 
interference in a market economy needs to be justified by some important 
efficiency or distributive target, which is failed by free markets. The normal 
answer is that  mandatory pension systems are necessary, because otherwise 
individuals would not provide sufficiently for old age. The two main reasons 
typically mentioned are: (1) Individuals might act as free-riders, relying on public 
assistance schemes when old; (2) Individuals might be myopic, that is, at the age 
of  20 or 30 many people are unable to recognise their future needs, when they 
will be old. A variant of the  latter argument is that individuals tend to act 
inconsistently over time, that is, though they in principle are willing to provide for 
the future, they postpone the required saving from one day to the other. In any 
case, it is clearly a paternalistic position, which in general is considered 
problematic among economists and should be invoked with particular care only, 
because it  conflicts with the axiom of consumer sovereignty. Similarly, the free-
rider argument corroborates only a modest extent of the public pension system, 
sufficient in order that old-age poverty is prevented. 
 
Nonpaternalistic arguments for a mandatory pension system may refer to 
limitations in the financial markets, such as asymmetric information problems, or 
to the target of inter- and intragenerational redistribution. Some of the latter will 
be discussed in further sections. 
 
 
II Pay-as-you-go versus funding  
In this section we formulate some basic relations describing the functioning of the 
pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) pension system, within  a simple overlapping-
generations model. Let Nt, t = 0, 1, ... denote the number of (identical) individuals 
arriving and working in period t, being retired in period t + 1. Let  tt be the 
contribution rate to PAYGO in period t and wt be the wage rate. With x t denoting 
pension benefits per capita we have the PAYGO budget equation in t + 1 
                                                 
2 According to Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin 1999, 166 countries have some kind of public old-age 
pension.   4
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Comparing this with the contribution of an individual born in period t, who 
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That is, rentability of PAYGO depends on the growth rates of the contribution 
rate, of wages (i. a., on productivity growth) and of the labour force. For constant 
contribution rates and with  1 + t w ˆ ,  1 + t N ˆ  denoting growth rates, the internal rate of 
return  1 + t i  of PAYGO in implicitly determined by the relation  
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that is, it equals the growth rate of the wage bill, determined by productivity and 
population growth. If we compare this with the market rate of return r t an 
individual would have earned if she had invested the same amount on the capital 
market instead of contributing to PAYGO, we arrive at the well-know Aaron 
condition: 
 
1 1 1 + + + + <
>
t t t N ˆ w ˆ r .   
 
Contributing to PAYGO decreases/increases life-time income compared to an 
investment on the capital market (in other words: compared to private saving or 
to a contribution to a fully-funded system), if the rate of interest is larger/lower   5
than the growth rate of the wage bill. The usual opinion is that the first of these 
possibilities holds in the long run, because otherwise the economy is 
characterised by so-called dynamic inefficiency, which means that reducing 
capital would increase welfare.
3  
 
However, even if one accepts this argument (see e. g. Abel et. al. 1989), theory 
does not tell us how big the difference between r and  N ˆ w ˆ +  is. In concrete 
projections, productivity growth is usually assumed to lie between 0,015 and 
0,025, while estimates for the real market rate of return range from 0,02 to 0,1, 
where the last number refers to investment in risky assets and includes a risk 
premium. 
 
Thus, if a person was free to choose a system for the provision for old age, 
according to the Aaron condition she would probably opt for an investment on the 
capital market. However, this decision has already been made, and it was for 
PAYGO, intended in favour of the first generation, where retired individuals in 
period 0 received some pension x 0 without having contributed when working one 
period before. That is, for them PAYGO was advantageous irrespective of the 
Aaron condition. 
 
It is interesting to relate the profit of the first generation to the losses of later 
generations, given that r t > i t. In doing this, we assume, for simplicity, that the 
interest rate r and the growth rates  w ˆ  and N ˆ , remain constant over time, hence 
also i. We start with considering the discounted loss, caused by the contribution 
to PAYGO, instead of a capital-market investment for a generation entering in t: 
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Adding the present value of these losses up to infinity we get 
 
                                                 
3 It should be noticed that we take the interest rate as exogenously fixed (small open economy). Most 
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That is, the gift to retirees in Period 0 (x0N-1 = tw0N0) equals exactly the present 
discounted value of the losses of all later generations (Spremann 1984, Sinn 
2000, Lindbeck and Persson 2002).
4 
 
This relation gives  us an indication for the answer to a question, which has 
puzzled economists and non-economists for some time: given r > i, a switch from 
PAYG0 to a funded system obviously produces a profit for later generations. 
However, one or more generations in transition lose, because they receive no or 
only an unexpectedly small pension out of PAYG, though they have contributed 
when working. Shouldn't it be possible to tax away some of the profits of later 
generations and to compensate generations in transition, i. e.: is a switch 
possible where no generation loses? The answer is "no" (Breyer 1989) and it has 
to do with the formula (5): With an existing PAYGO, a given total amount and a 
time path of losses is fixed, any change of the system could only change the time 
path, making some generation worse of and some better off.  
 
III The deadweight loss of contributions to the pay-as-you-go system 
Now we briefly turn to another idea how a Pareto-improving transition from a 
PAYGO to a funded system could be managed (Homburg 1990, Breyer and 
Straub 1993). It starts from an extension of the above model, which used the 
assumption of a fixed labour supply l = 1. With variable labour supply, the 
financing of public activities through taxes causes a deadweight loss. If the 
contribution to the PAYGO can also be seen as a kind of tax, then removing it 
through a switch to the funded system would also remove the deadweight loss 
                                                 
4 Obviously, the same holds for the pension claims in later periods as well.    7
and, thus, create a surplus, which could be used for a compensation of the 
generations which otherwise would lose in the process of transition.  
 
With variable labour supply l, the discounted available labour income (gross 
income minus contribution plus discounted pension) for an individual, given 
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where t(r-i)/(1+r) represents the effective tax rate. It is at least conceivable that 
abolishing the tax indeed creates additional welfare, whose money equivalent 
can be used for compensation of potential users. 
 
However, one should be aware that in reality distorting taxes instead of lump-sum 
taxes exist for a certain reason, which is: differences between individuals. In a 
world with identical individuals, as it was modeled in the foregoing section, it does 
not make sense to have distorting taxes, one could always use a head tax, which 
does not cause any deadweight loss. Thus, in order to discuss the above idea 
adequately, one has to depart from the assumption of identical individuals, that 
is, in the present context, of identical wage rates.  
 
With differing individuals, (at least) two different versions of PAYGO are possible, 
concerning the way, benefits are ascribed to pensioneers: either there is a single 
lump-sum benefit x t+1 for every individual, or benefits differ according to prior 
contributions, that is to labour income. It is straight forward to see that in case of 
the latter, when benefits are strictly proportional to own contributions (which could 
be termed an individually "fair" system), formula (6) still describes the marginal 
tax rate where 
k
t w  and 
k
t l  should both be indexed by k to indicate differing 
individuals. In case of the former, this is no longer true. Because of the strong 
redistributive element, in fact t represents the effective marginal tax rate, as the 
benefit x t+1 is lump-sum, independent of labour income. It is clear that in such a 
system the associated deadweigh loss is much larger.   8
 
The important point now is that with either system, some given distribution of the 
contributions, benefits and deadweight losses over the individuals is associated. 
Any step in the reduction of PAYGO, in order to decrease the deadweight loss, 
can only mean a reduction of the contribution rate and an introduction of a lump-
sum element. It is true that this reduces the deadweight loss, but at the same 
time it changes the distribution of taxes and benefits. One can show that except 
in specific cases
5, it is not possible to design a change of the contributions such 
that indeed the deadweight loss is  reduced and at the same time enough 
revenue is collected to finance the pensions of the retired, without making some 
of the individuals worse off (Brunner 1994, 1996). That is, redistribution within a 
generation occurs.  
 
IV Reactions to aging 
So far we have discussed two main ideas how to transform PAYGO to a funded 
system without making some individual or generation worse off. Unfortunately, it 
turned out that these ideas do not really work. In the literature, other proposals 
for a painless transformation were made, but it seems fair to say that these do 
not provide realistic alternatives either. 
 
Given this insight, what should then be an adequate reaction in view of the 
expected aging of the society? 
 
First of all, the non-existence of a Pareto-improving reform obviously does not 
preclude any reform. However, as any reform implies specific redistributive 
effects across (and probably also within) generations, these effects should be 
made visible and they should be justified by some accepted norm. Moreover, as 
was mentioned in the introduction, a main argument for establishing a mandatory 
system at all is based on a paternalistic view and should therefore not be applied  
on a large scale. 
 
                                                 
5 Essentially: when with the existing PAYGO system contributions are collected in an inefficient way. 
Obviously, this inefficiency could also be removed without changing the system.    9
As can easily be seen in our simple model in section II, the consequence of a 
decline in population growth in period t + 1 is a fall of the internal rate of return of 
PAYGO (unless an increase in productivity growth offsets this effect, but there is 
no convincing reason to assume this to occur). There are three obvious possible 
reactions: 
1.   accept the fall of the rate of return, that is, the lower pension xt+1. 
2.   increase the contribution rate tt+1 in order to keep the rate of returns it+1 at the 
level of the period before the decline of labour force growth. 
3.   force individuals in period t to save an additional amount, by collecting this as 
a contribution to a newly established funded system, such that the (low) 
PAYGO benefit x t+1 plus the repayment from the new funded system is 
roughly equal to the PAYGO pension benefit in case that population growth 
would not have fallen. 
 
What can be said concerning the welfare effects of these alternatives? First, it is 
clear that with the first one the burden due to a fall of N ˆ  is laid on the generation 
born in t, while this generations profits from the second. 
 
However, returning to formula (5) above, one observes immediately that this 
profit goes at the costs of later generations: the present value of the sum of their 
losses from a participation in PAYGO increases. 
 
Whether variant 1 or variant 2 is preferred depends on value judgements and 
cannot be decided by an economist. The answer is certainly not clear-cut as the 
following example indicates: given the assumption of future technical progress, 
the Rawlsian  criterion might suggest to lay some additional burden on future 
generations, who will be better off anyway (Breyer 2000). However, one should 
surely be reluctant to suggest this solution, as it appears unfair to burden future 
generations. 
 
Secondly, a further observation concerns the third alternative mentioned above: it 
is difficult to see how this could be superior to the first, because in addition to the 
acceptance of the lower internal rate of return of PAYGO it implies forced saving,   10
which certainly does not increase welfare of the affected generation, at least not 
in our standard economic model of household behaviour. One has to invoke 
additional arguments (myopia, imperfect financial markets,…) in order to justify 
this measure. From a liberal point of view, one might say that, as long as the 
existing PAYGO will, even with a reduced internal rate of return, provide a 
sufficient minimum pension, an additional mandatory system can hardly be 
justified. What seems to be more important is a clear and timely  projection of 




Finally, it should be mentioned that in our simple overlapping-generations model 
with only two periods it is not possible to investigate a further possible reaction to 
a decrease of population (growth), namely an increase of the retirement age. In 
principle, this measure is not too much different from alternative one above, 
because in a sense it replaces the burden of a lower rate of return by that of a 
longer working time, without higher benefits. Obviously, how these alternatives 
are ranked, depends on the relation between marginal disutility of labour at 
retirement age and marginal utility of income when retired. The most preferable 
way seems to be to give the individuals a  choice between working longer or 
receiving a lower benefit. However, defining appropriate incentives for this choice 
is not a straightforward task.  
 
V Macroeconomic considerations 
In the last section we turn to a discussion of some macroeconomic questions, 
which are related to pension reforms. We start with the well-known and much 
criticised Mackenroth’s thesis, which states that in every period consumption of 
the retired must come from GNP of that period. Taken literally, this statement is 
certainly true, but does it mean that the method of how the pension system is 
organised does not matter? Sometimes it is interpreted in that way. 
 
                                                 
6 It is of course also a possibility to induce additional savings through tax incentives instead of  a 
mandatory contribution.  This way of government intervention needs to be justified by specific 
arguments as well.    11
Obviously, Mackenroth’s thesis is valid for a given level of production in every 
period. However, the question indeed is whether the pension system influences 
the level of production in an economy in the course of time. The theoretical line of 
argument goes as follows: if, in the period of introduction of PAYGO, the 
contributions of the working generation would have been saved instead of giving 
them to the retired for their consumption, this would have raised the available 
stock of capital, therefore production (and income) in the following periods would 
have been larger (see, e.g.; Homburg 1988). Again, we see that the profit of the 
initially retired generation comes from losses of later generations. 
 
Similarly, it follows from this argument that any attempt to introduce more funding 
into the pension system – through mandatory saving or saving incentives – has a 
real positive effect only if it leads to a larger available income in the future. 
Otherwise it may have an influence on the share of consumption of the old and 
the young, respectively, but an expansion of each reduces that of the other.  
 
There are two question one has to ask then:  
 
First: Does additional mandatory (or tax-credit induced) saving indeed increase 
macroeconomic savings? It seems not to be very realistic to assume that a one-
to-one increase takes place, part of the additional savings for pensions will simply 
replace other forms of holding wealth (comp. e.g., Mitchell and Zeldes 1996). 
This again seems to suggest that measures to establish additional funding 
should be confined to guarantee a minimum necessary pension, in order to avoid 
free-riding and myopia. 
Second: Does additional macroeconomic saving indeed produce higher income 
in the future? Obviously, it is not savings but some form of real investment, which 
is decisive. Of course, from a (neo-)classical perspective, the answer to this 
question is clearly “yes”: savings are the prerequisite for investment. However, 
from a Keynesian perspective, things are not so clear, because increased 
savings means less aggregate demand: savings may mean less production 
instead of more investment. Usually it is argued that in the long-run – which is the 
appropriate horizon for pension reforms – the classical perspective is the relevant   12
one. However, an appropriate view could also be that the long-run consists of a 
sequence of short-runs and it is those, which matter. 
 
Whatever the true view may be, the consideration of these macroeconomic 
aspects certainly sheds additional light on the question of funding the pension 
system. In particular, it makes clear that it is not investment of money in some 
investment fund which ultimately determines future available income, but how 
this affects the real-economy variables like investment and production.   13
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